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With respect to any inference we might make about an individual having a certain prop-
erty, Kyburg’s theory of epistemological probability requires us to assume that the individ-
ual under discussion is randomly drawn from some reference class. The probability that the
individual has the property is equal to the proportion of individuals in the reference class
having that property. When this proportion, or its lower bound, is sufﬁciently high, the
individual is said to be practically certain to hold the property.
The ideas of epistemological randomness and practical certainty address the same infer-
ential problems addressed by the manipulation of abnormality predicates in circumscrip-
tion and other nonmonotonic reasoning formalisms. This article revisits the goals and
problems of nonmonotonic reasoning through the lens of epistemological probability.
 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Nonmonotonic reasoning (NMR) is based on the observation that people, and perhaps other living things, reason effec-
tively using fragments of knowledge that seem to be uncertain, and incomplete. Perhaps scientists accept their lot that
knowledge always will be so, and they devote their lives to better knowing the world and how to reason about it, so that
we all might make better inferences.
People also seem to be able to reason with apparently inconsistent knowledge, and seem to compete successfully in com-
plex domains with these kinds of knowledge limitations, without much knowledge beyond their daily observations, without
training in formal reasoning, and perhaps without even knowing they are reasoning. Hence, this kind of inference is often
called ‘‘common-sense reasoning’’.
Common-sense reasoning is rich and complex. Surely it could be said that commonsense inspires much of philosophy. So,
I restrict this investigation to the classic ‘‘birds ﬂy’’ problem, where people ‘‘jump’’ to the conclusion that a bird ﬂies without
knowing whether the bird is caged, or dead, or a penguin. In NMR circles, this is referred to as the ‘‘speciﬁcity’’ problem [12]
and amongst philosophers of epistemological probability, it is called the problem of the reference class [6,18]. Nearly every
piece of practical knowledge we hold has such exceptions (a meta-level default!), yet we seem to reason in the presence of
such exceptions without training.
There are other kinds of common-sense reasoning. Introducing circumscription, McCarthy [9] describes the problem of
crossing a river, where a boat is available. Most of us presented with the problem on paper would suggest crossing the river
with the boat. Perhaps in real life, if the river was wide, we would prefer to use a bridge (which might be downstream) or a
helicopter. We might even wish to sprout wings and ﬂy across, and from a purely logical perspective, none of these options
are impossible. In both the theoretical and real life versions, we are likely to solve the problem by simply taking the boat.
Since the other possibilities were not mentioned, they are circumscribed out of the solution space. However, the ‘‘birds. All rights reserved.
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paper, when we refer to NMR, we refer to this particular problem. It is not difﬁcult to informally cast circumscription as
NMR in any case.
The identiﬁcation of the ‘‘birds ﬂy’’ pattern of plausible inference, just one of several introduced in the 1980 special issue
of the Artiﬁcial Intelligence journal, caused a stir within the AI community. In an unknowable world populated by individuals
who generally know little about formal logic, and even hold relatively little formal knowledge, the ‘‘birds ﬂy’’ pattern seemed
to be quintessential intelligent reasoning. What AI problem could not be solved by a machine using such reasoning, once
computationally effective inference rules were unlocked?
Thus did NMR take ﬂight. The articles in the 1980 special issue demonstrated the core community’s maturity and also
created enthusiasm about the potential for a powerful general solution.
At that time, there were reasons to be optimistic about a solution. The resolution rule had revolutionized automated the-
orem proving in 1965. The ﬁrst versions of the programming language Prolog, based on the Horn clause subset of logic and
ordered linear resolution, appeared in 1972, and tightly linked (logical) deduction to computation. During the 1970s, frame
systems and ﬁrst-generation diagnostic expert systems like MYCIN demonstrated the potential of artiﬁcial reasoning in spe-
cialized domains, but also revealed the brittleness of their heuristics. This concordance of events created the conditions that
convinced many new researchers to turn to the ﬁrst-order logic as a solid semantic basis for both NMR and diagnosis.
The excitement went well beyond the campus. In an article entitled ‘‘How to Clone an Expert’’, Time Magazine reported as
follows on the 1985 IJCAI:
. . .Five years ago, a similar meeting at Stanford University was attended by 900 earnest academics. The UCLA gathering
drew a crowd of 10,000 that included military brass, investment bankers and scores of corporate headhunters.
Things quieted down after David Poole reported his discovery of a variation of Kyburg’s lottery paradox [15] in several
ﬂavors of NMR. In the sequel, I will argue that the paradox was present in the initial formulation of the problem, but the
formal machinery developed only pushed the contradictions to a less intuitive level. Speciﬁcally, in the 1980s, several
researchers began formalizing an abnormality predicate that crudely approximated a dual of Kyburg’s epistemologicial ran-
domness. Because the issue of acceptance was not addressed or thought of at the outset, the lottery paradox sprung up later
unexpectedly and, I would argue, devastatingly.
Another theme of this paper is that much of the work in the 1980s converged towards the ideas Kyburg had already
thought out earlier. This paper examines the foundational thinking generated in particular by Reiter’s work on default logic,
which advocated that jumping to conclusions from sentences normally not considered categorical (defaults) could proceed
in a principled way so long as inconsistencies did not arise. In particular, Reiter provided a succinct solution to a simple ver-
sion of the ‘‘birds ﬂy’’ problem. Circumscription more broadly sought to model how we reason with incomplete information
– how we ‘‘make do’’ with the knowledge we have, even though it is possible to construct sentences with any number of
disjunctions that might be true that we might consider – but treated NMR as a special case of this. McCarthy [10] almost
reconstructed Kyburg’s theory of epistemological randomness using the negation of a parameterized predicate ab (for abnor-
mal) in place of Kyburg’s randomness, together with cancelation axioms. This idea was pursued by others, including Poole.
Many formalisms emerged during the 1980s to deal with problems of nonmonotonic reasoning, notably including Tour-
etzky et al.[23]. Some of these cast the problem differently to avoid counterintuitive results. Because of there are so many
treatments of NMR, the present work will circumscribe the discussion to the connection between abnormality in NMR the-
ories and randomness in Kyburg’s work.
Because Kyburg’s formalism itself is large, I will ﬁrst present a coarse-grained overview of the aspects of Kyburg’s work
relevant to this discussion. I will then discuss the independent evolution of NMR by considering key features of three prom-
inent yet related NMR formalisms with roots in ﬁrst order logic: default logic, circumscription and Theorist. I will then infor-
mally argue that perhaps because these formalisms eschewed any probabilistic interpretation of commonsense reasoning,
the equivalent of Kyburg’s idea of acceptance, which effectively acts as a ‘‘brake’’ on inference, did not evolve in these sys-
tems, and hence the paradoxes.
2. Kyburg and NMR
Suppose a website reports that about 55% of American households own a computer. The same website states that about
95% of households earning more than $100,000 own a computer, and about 41% of households earning less than $40,000
have a computer.
Now imagine two households. The ﬁrst consists of only your friend Jim, who earns about $30,000. He is an ardent gamer
and websurfer and you know for a fact he owns a computer. The other household consists of just Shelley, about whom you
know nothing. What are the probabilities respectively that Jim’s household and Shelley’s household own a computer?
The commonsense answers seem to be that Jim certainly owns a computer, and that Shelley owns a computer with prob-
ability 0.55. We know the former statement for a fact. As for Shelley, we have no reason to make an inference about her in-
come, and therefore choose the ﬁrst, most general, statistic, even though the fact is either she owns a computer or not.
Kyburg’s theory of epistemological probability [Kyburg83] produces these inferences by supposing that individuals make
such judgements from a database of statistical statements that give upper and lower bounds on the proportion of X’s that
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Thus, where statistical statements have the general form %(property, reference class, lower bound, upper bound), we could
write%ðown-computer; households;0:55;0:55Þ
encoding the statistic about households generally. The upper and lower bounds are identical above, perhaps because the
sample size is very large, but it might be the case that%ðown-computer; households;0:54;0:56Þ
if there was some imprecision about the measurement.
All I know about Shelley is that she constitutes a household. If I know that 55% of households own a computer, it seems
reasonable to say ‘‘the probability Shelley has a computer in her household is 0.55’’. If I subsequently discover that Shelley’s
income is $100,000, I am practically certain that she owns a computer. That is, the probability she owns a computer is 0.95,
which is different from saying that the long-term frequency of selecting Shelley-like individuals who are also computer own-
ers is 0.95.
The principle behind this is that we make an inference about an individual based on the narrowest statistic that repre-
sents that individual according to the evidence we currently have about that individual. We would be surprised if Shelley did
not own a computer, since a probability of 0.95, is a good threshold for certainly for most practical purposes.
Initially, the narrowest reference term that includes Shelley seems to be ‘‘household’’. After I discover her income, the
narrowest reference termwould seem to be ‘‘households earning more than $100,000’’. Kyburg calls this the subset principle.
That is, if an individual I is a member of two sets A and B, and A is a subset of B, we prefer the interval associated with A to
make an inference about I.
Some of the logic-based NMR AI formalisms understood the subset principle by the term speciﬁcity, ﬁrst noticed in the AI
community by Poole [12]. However, there is a problem with choosing solely on the basis of narrowness. Let’s revisit the
inference we made about Jim.
If we were conﬁned to using only the three household statistics from the website to make an inference about the prob-
ability Jim owns a computer, we would have to conclude that he is a member of a household earning less than $40,000, and
that he therefore owns a computer with probability 0.41. We could choose to have the probability Jim owns a computer to be
something we can’t deﬁne (because it is not part of a long-run frequency), or we could choose to have the probability be
something different from the fact that he owns a computer. However, because Jim is known to own a computer, and we
are, after all, using the ﬁrst order logic, we can logically construct the statistic%ðown-computer;fJimg;1:0;1:0Þ:
That is, the singleton set {Jim} is a narrower than the set of households earning less than $40,000. This constructed statistic is
a logical consequence of our knowledge, and we can now use this as the narrowest statistic about Jim to get the answer that
agrees with commonsense intuitions.
However, this now creates a problem with the inference about Shelley. By the same logic, we can construct the statistic%ðown-computer;fShellyg; 0:0;1:0Þ:
That is, since we do not know that Shelley owns a computer, the above statistic could fall anywhere between zero and one. If
we choose the statistic strictly on the basis of narrowness, we have to plead complete ignorance about Shelly, no matter how
much statistical knowledge we have, and no matter how much other knowledge we have about Shelley.
Hence the ‘‘supersample principle’’. That is, where B is a supersample of A, favor the supersample. This principle derives
its rationale from the statistical fact that given two samples, a larger sample gives a more precise result.
The supersample and subset principles pull in opposite directions. Kyburg resolves the conﬂict by choosing ‘‘the narrow-
est reference class for which there exist adequate statistics’’, where a statistic of a set is not adequate if its interval contains
the interval of its superset. Attaching the statistical information about a set to the individual is called direct inference, and this
elegantly produces the desired conclusions about Jim and Shelley. Moreover, as we learn more about either individual, the
formalism seems to nonmonotonically guide us to the desired conclusion.
Kyburg wraps these two notions up in the assumption of epistemological randomness: with respect to a property P, as-
sume that an individual is a randommember of the narrowest reference class for which there exist adequate statistics about
P. If an individual is known to be a member of households making less than $40,000, we know the individual is not typical of
a random household, and cannot assume it to be a random member of that set. (It is possible to construct examples where
the formalism acts a little oddly, but this is mostly due to discontinuities on the boundaries between adequacy and
inadequacy.)
This allows us to make a probabilistic inference about an individual based on a statistic. But what about the ‘‘jumping’’ to
categorical conclusions that many NMR researchers claim humans perform?
Kyburg solves this with the ideas of acceptance and practical certainty. Simply put, probabilistic inferences about individ-
uals that are greater than some threshold are accepted as practically certain. I am practically certain my alarm will ring
tomorrow. When it does, I am practically certain my car will start, and if I leave at my usual time, I am practically certain
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jam on the freeway, I adjust my plan for the day accordingly. I may be aggravated, but not by inferential problems.
In the longer example above involving Shelley, the facts unfolded so that the probability Shelley owned a computer was
initially 0.55. Upon ﬁnding out she was a high earner, she was practically certain to own a computer. Upon ﬁnding out she in
fact did not own a computer, she was certain to not own a computer.
A practical certainty has a different status than a certainty. (Kyburg also distinguishes between logical certainties that
follow from axioms of logic and mathematics, evidential certainty of the things we observe, and the practical certainty of con-
clusions we draw from these other sentences. I do not explore those distinctions here.) A practical certainty cannot in general
be combined (by logical conjunction) with other practical certainties to create a new practical certainty. Otherwise, we might
run into the lottery paradox. For any threshold of practical certainty written as 1  1/n, we can construct a fair lottery of n
tickets, where it is practically certain that each ticket will lose the lottery. If practical certainties could be conjoined, it would
be practically certain that all the tickets would lose. But this violates the construction of the lottery, where it is certain that
some ticket will win.
Thus, practical certainties are added to a knowledge base as members of a set, where the conjunction of any number of
practical certainties is a practical certainty only if it can be proved, using the usual mathematics of probability, to be a prac-
tical certainty. If the threshold for practical certainty is 0.95, it may be the case that we know two practical certainties A, B,
both of which have probabilities of [0.975,0.975]. But P(B) = P(AB) + P(AB), and P(AB) = p(BjA)⁄P(A) <= 0.025, so
p(AB) >= 0.95.
The exact choice of threshold does not matter much. If we are looking for an explanation of how people reason, the exact
value of the threshold is not likely hard-coded or ﬁxed for every context, just as the statistics from which such inferences are
made may be subjectively skewed. This is troubling, but it is less troubling than a formalism riddled with paradoxes. Fur-
thermore, it is possible to do experiments that assist in eliciting what such thresholds in fact are, and how they vary in con-
texts, and once they are determined, it is possible to measure whether they hold true or not.
Historically, the various NMR formalisms eschewed numerical probabilities. Indeed, early articles make a point of the fact
they make no reference to probabilities, whether numeric or qualitative. On that note, we turn to the well-known Tweety
story, which describes our beliefs about the ﬂying capabilities of certain classes of creatures in the context of a simple hier-
archical taxonomy and a little evidence about some individuals. The story has been modiﬁed slightly for the present
discussion:
Warm-blooded creatures typically do not ﬂy.
Birds typically ﬂy.
Penguins typically (there is almost always an exception to any rule) do not ﬂy.
Penguins are birds.
Birds are warm-blooded animals.
Silver is a warm-blooded animal.
Tweety is a bird.
Chilly-Willy is a penguin.
This article is freewheeling with notation. Assume the formalizations of the above sentences are all universally quantiﬁed.
Because of contradictory conventions in the logic community and the logic programming community, I will trust the reader
to determine by context which tokens represent predicates, variables and atoms.
Thus, an approximation of the above with ﬁrst-order logic as follows -penguinðXÞ ) birdðXÞ ) warmbloodðXÞ;
warmbloodðXÞ ) :flyðXÞ;
birdðXÞ ) flyðXÞ;
penguinðXÞ ) :flyðXÞ;
penguinðChillyWillyÞ ^ birdðTweetyÞ ^warmbloodðSilverÞ;– will not do because the sentences are logically inconsistent. This representation implicitly uses unknown thresholds for
certainty, and hence, the lottery paradox is a problem right off the bat.
Assume that the ﬁrst three generalizations are uncontested bits of commonsense knowledge, (even though bird species
outnumber mammal species by two to one), and that the taxonomy and the observations about Silver, Tweety and Chilly-
Willy are indisputably true. Given this knowledge, humans appear to jump to the conclusion that Silver does not ﬂy, Tweety
does, and Chilly-Willy does not. Moreover, these inferences are performed without the beneﬁt of any statistical knowledge,
in particular, and no exact knowledge about distributions of ﬂying ability among the various categories. Furthermore, hu-
mans are nonplussed when they subsequently learn that Tweety is a penguin, Silver is a canary, and Chilly-Willy is simply
known to ﬂy (he was taught in the circus). They just revise their beliefs accordingly. However contrived the example, the
prevalence of this reasoning pattern is difﬁcult to dispute: humans seem to reason ‘‘logically’’ (perhaps ‘‘rationally’’ is a bet-
ter adverb) in the presence of conﬂicting information with considerable facility.
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for acceptance), and practical certainties are not conjoined, Kyburg’s formalism (e.g., epistemological randomness) provides
all the desired inferences.
Now let’s turn to the solutions provided by NMR.
3. Default logic
An early default rule in database theory was the ‘‘closed world assumption’’ [19]. If you do not know, or cannot prove,
something, it is not true. For example, a knowledge base might list all females by name, and anyone not identiﬁed as a female
is not a female and therefore a male. This may have worked well for keeping databases small in an era when memory was
expensive, and also motivated the use of negation as failure in Prolog. Thus, ability to prove (in some sense) became a thresh-
old for belief.
Reiter’s [20] initial presentation of default reasoning extends the closed world assumption by characterizing defaults as
sentences that are ‘‘almost always’’ true, except in the presence of conﬂicting information. That birds normally ﬂy is represented
as a special default inference rule, which we write here asbirdðXÞ ‘D flyðXÞ:
The above sentence is to be read as ‘‘if it is known that X is a bird, and it is consistent (with the currently generated set of
beliefs) to conclude that X can ﬂy, then infer ﬂy (X)’’.
In [20], Reiter considered the following substory about Tweety (adapted):birdðXÞ ‘D flyðXÞ;
penguinðXÞ ) birdðXÞ;
penguinðXÞ ) :flyðXÞ;
birdðTweetyÞ:
penguinðChilly-WillyÞ:
ð1ÞReiter’s default logic draws the correct conclusions about Tweety the bird and Chilly-Willy the penguin: Tweety ﬂies, Chilly-
Willy does not. As well, the formalism allows us to easily encode many other categorical exceptions (dead birds, ostriches) to
the single default rule.
Reiter demonstrated other promising features of this formalism. For example, defaults subsume the closed world
assumption:‘DmaleðXÞ;
femaleðXÞ () :maleðXÞ:Reiter also demonstrated that the formalism is not adventurous. That is, it does not force us to draw a conclusion in settings
where the conﬂicting evidence should lead us to say ‘‘I don’t know’’.
This requires a little more formal machinery. Reiter deﬁnes an extension to be (approximately) a maximal consistent
deductive closure of a set of defaults. His presentation of the Tweety story contains only the ‘‘birds ﬂy’’ inference rule. All
exceptions to the default are categorical – dead birds, roasted chickens, penguins and ostriches absolutely do not ﬂy. Thus
his Tweety scenario has a single extension in which Tweety ﬂies, and furthermore, is not a penguin, not dead, and so on. This
latter inference is because we can chain from Tweety ﬂying, to the negation of penguin using the contrapositive formflyðXÞ ) :penguinðXÞ
of the logical exception.
Now, consider the conﬂicting defaults that state that a person is likely to live in the same town as his employer, and that a
person lives in the same town as the person’s spouse, which we write here aslives inðemployerðXÞ; YÞ ‘D lives inðX; YÞ;
lives inðspouseðXÞ; YÞ ‘D lives inðX; YÞ:These defaults suggest that people generally live in the same town (Y) as their employer, and their spouse.
If Mary’s husband lives in New York, but her employer lives in Los Angeles, there are two extensions, and in each Mary
lives in one of two different cities. The presence of multiple extensions gives us a way of semantically characterizing truly
conﬂicting defaults. Reiter suggests that choosing among extensions is a pragmatic matter. Referring to the case of Mary,
perhaps defaults need to be ranked according to plausibility, or perhaps the reasoner needs to rationalize the discrepancy.
For example, try to discover if she has been recently separated or whether she is working for a remote employer.
I would agree there is no epistemological need to choose between these extensions. Conﬂicting evidence occurs all the
time, and on the basis of such evidence, it is reasonable to plead insufﬁcient knowledge, or perhaps to give a disjunctive an-
swer, which just puts a narrower bound on our uncertainty. However, I would argue that multiple extensions indicate a tech-
nical problem when it comes to hierarchies with exceptions. If we replace the third sentence in (1⁄) with
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we get multiple extensions with respect to Chilly-Willy. In one, Chilly-Willy ﬂies because he is a normal bird. In the other, he
does not ﬂy because he is a normal penguin. It is hard to think of the two extensions as conﬂicting explanations resulting
from conﬂicting evidence. Rather, one seems to be the ‘‘right answer extension’’ and the other is the ‘‘wrong answer exten-
sion’’. Reiter did not address this type of story either in [20], or in his later survey on nonmonotonic reasoning [22], but Reiter
and Etherington [1] addressed this using a similar example. Their solution, similar to the cancelation axioms of McCarthy,
added explicit links to block the unwanted conclusions. The work did not provide an objective semantical way for introduc-
ing this new type of link.
To sum up, default logic gives tidy qualitative solutions to a microversion of the Tweety story, the closed world assump-
tion, and genuine ambiguity, using ﬁrst order logic, using an interesting interaction between theorem proving and consis-
tency checking. Reiter [20] asks the reader to ‘‘Notice that we have provided a representation for the ‘fuzzy’ quantiﬁer
‘most’ or ‘almost all’ in terms of defaults, without appealing to frequency distributions or numbers.’’ In later work, he states
[22]‘‘. . . to appeal exclusively to a statistical reading for plausible inference is to misunderstand the intended purpose of non-
monotonic reasoning.’’ He goes on to say ‘‘much of what passes for human commonsense reasoning may at heart be puzzle
solving’’.
Reiter’s formalism is the most conservative of the three NMR formalisms. (see the discussion on contraposing defaults
later.) He and Crisculo [21] contemplated many interesting properties of defaults, and in particular observed that defaults
are not necessarily transitive. Allowing transitivity amounts to taking conjunctions of practical certainties, which suggests
Reiter and Crisculo had an idea that approximate statements could not always be conjoined. For example, if high school
dropouts are typically adults, and adults are typically employed, one may not wish to conclude that high school dropouts
are typically employed. Reiter and Crisculo showed how to use semi-normal defaults to limit such inferences, but these were
simply done by the knowledge engineer and were not part of the inferential machinery.
Colleagues describe Reiter as a meticulous researcher. One thus wonders what else Reiter might have had to say about the
full Tweety story.4. Circumscription
McCarthy’s circumscription [9] as originally described also generalizes and extends the closed world assumption. Given a
database describing relationships and objects, we may wish to assume, for practical purposes, that we know everything
about a predicate. For instance, given a list of club members, we may wish to assume that no one else is a club member.
If new people join the club, the formalism can recompute the extension of the clubMember predicate.
For simplicity, the results stated here about circumscription are true for databases similar to the Tweety story, repre-
sented as statistical statements in Kyburg and normal default inference rules in Reiter.
Following [10], If P is a predicate in a database D(P), where U(X)) P(X) (for some U(X) not deﬁned in terms of P), then
the circumscription of P in D(P) isDðPÞ ^UðXÞ () PðXÞ:
This asserts the only values of X that satisfy P are the ones that have to.
For example, if it is known thatclubMemberðaÞ ^ clubMemberðbÞ ^ clubMemberðcÞ;
circumscription, like the closed world assumption, will conclude :clubMember (d), :clubMember (e) and :clubMember (f),
and so on, since none of these can be proven. To do this, circumscribe clubMember using U(X) = (X = a _ X = b _ X = c), which
yieldsclubMemberðXÞ ) X ¼ a _ X ¼ b _ X ¼ c:
Generally, there is no procedure for deducing U(X).
McCarthy’s 1980 paper did not address reasoning in the presence of exceptions. This discussion appeared in [10], where
he introduced the abnormality predicate, and used indexed predicates of the form :abi to make statements about normality.
The Tweety story, as described already, is initially encoded aspenguinðXÞ ) birdðXÞ ) warmbloodðXÞ;
warmbloodðXÞ ^ :ab1ðXÞ ) :flyðXÞ;
birdðXÞ ^ :ab2ðXÞ ) flyðXÞ;
penguinðXÞ ^ :ab3ðXÞ ) :flyðXÞ:The last sentence is read as ‘‘penguins normally don’t ﬂy’’.
Even before performing the circumscription, this representation is more adventurous (permits more inferences) than Re-
iter’s formalism. Where Reiter’s inference rule permits something to ﬂy given it is a bird, the circumscriptive representation
allows the contrapositive, allowing the inference that non-ﬂying objects are non-birds. This is generally inconsistent with
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aviary, perhaps) that most non-ﬂying things are birds. Although I have not read a convincing rationale for contraposing of
defaults, and there even seems to be evidence that humans ﬁnd the contraposition counterintuitive [2], the designers of for-
malisms that allowed the contrapositive seemed pleased with this feature, perhaps because it gave ‘‘commonsense’’ infer-
ence more of the look and feel of ﬁrst-order logic.
Circumscription, like other NMR formalisms, is not trivial. The full ﬁrst-order logic is powerful by itself, and circumscrip-
tion is a second-order calculus for minimizing extensions of predicates. Where predicates interact, it can be necessary to pro-
duce circumscription policies that provide details for how the circumscription is to be done. For simplicity, I will again use the
circumscription formula above intuitively and assure the reader that the results are sufﬁciently similar to those reported in
the original literatures. On the other hand, I will take the reader through at least a few steps by way of underscoring the both
the subtlety of the problem and the complexity of the solution.
My goal is to convince the reader that where Kyburg’s formalism shows how to consistently make a single assumption
about the random process by which an individual was chosen, McCarthy’s formalism generates a set of abnormality pred-
icates and axiomatizes them, to similar effect – nearly.
To do the circumscription, make abi the consequent of each clause separately, and complete the biconditionals. Applying
the circumscription formula to each abnormality predicate separately results in the following new sentences being added to
the database:warmbloodðXÞ ^ flyðXÞ () ab1ðXÞ;
birdðXÞ ^ :flyðXÞ () ab2ðXÞ;
penguinðXÞ ^ flyðXÞ () ab3ðXÞ:This does not yield the needed results. If Chilly-Willy is a penguin, we can conclude that either it does not ﬂy or ab3(Chilly-
Willy). Alternately, we can conclude that it ﬂies or ab2 (Chilly-Willy), and so on. Recognizing the interaction between sub-
classes, McCarthy introduces the cancellation of inheritance axioms. Paraphrasing, he states that a bird is abnormal with re-
gards to ab1(X), so we do not want to use the superset warmblood to show it can ﬂy. Hence, addbirdðXÞ ) ab1ðXÞ:
A similar argument applies to penguins and the superset bird, and so we also addpenguinðXÞ ) ab2ðXÞ:
The cancelation of inheritance axioms accomplish something similar to that of the subset principle in Kyburg’s randomness.
Membership in certain subsets invalidates inferences with the superset. McCarthy did not demonstrate an algorithm for gen-
erating cancelation axioms, but it is easy enough to do for similar settings.
If the circumscription is done after adding the cancelation axioms, the multiplicity of conclusions is reduced, but the for-
malism can still only conclude that a bird either ﬂies or is ab1.
A tighter bound on the abi is possible through the introduction of varying predicates. In particular, allow ﬂy to vary so as to
minimize the abi. Why ﬂy should vary, and not bird? McCarthy states that we are trying to decide what ﬂies given we have
decided it is a bird. Since a stated beneﬁt of circumscription, and the logic-based formalisms generally is that inferences
should be sensitive to semantics rather than syntax, this allows the same inference whether ‘‘birds ﬂy’’ is written as a ‘‘log-
ically equivalent’’ contrapositive or disjunction. The decision of which predicates ought to vary is an example of a circum-
scription policy. Fortunately, for Tweety type databases, a handy theorem is available to minimize the abi with ﬂy varying.
For details see Nillson and Genesereth [3, p. 149] for the theorem and its application to this example.
This is still not quite enough to get us the right conclusions about Silver, Tweety, and Chilly-Willy: we must circumscribe
each of penguin, bird and warmblood so that only the known individuals are in the extensions of their respective predicates,
as we did earlier with the clubMember example. Finally, this achieves a result similar to Kyburg’s direct inference – the prob-
ability is lifted from the statistic to the individual.
Kyburg and Teng [8] write that of all the NMR formalisms, circumscription is the most difﬁcult to visualize. In fairness, the
designers of circumscription had an agenda much broader than NMR problems of the Tweety variety, and may have not had
perspicuity as a goal.
The next formalism captures much of the technical feel of circumscription, but is far more intuitive.
5. Theorist
Even though Theorist [13,14,16] did not become as widely known as Reiter’s defaults or circumscription, there are at least
four good reasons to look at it here: (1) the underlying principles of Theorist are simple and intuitive, like Reiter’s, and a little
broader, (2) it is nonetheless about as ﬂexible as circumscription, (3) it comes with a slick Prolog implementation, (4) and it
was the formalism that famously revealed the persistence of the lottery paradox.
Theorist’s proponents [PGA83] argued for a powerful umbrella formalism that solved both default reasoning and diagno-
sis. The original Theorist formalism consisted of a two kinds of syntactically identical knowledge: facts (categorically true
statements), and defaults, which later became known as assumptions. Diagnosis was accomplished by ‘‘proving’’ an observed
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default inference was accomplished by proving the desired conclusion (say, ﬂy (Tweety)) from facts and assuming instances
of :abi type predicates in a consistent fashion. Any conclusion drawnwas characterized by a set of sets of defaults, each set of
which was necessary for a proof, and each of which was consistent with the facts. Each set of defaults approximately cor-
responded to an extension in default logic.
Thus, Poole and others had noticed the same multiple extension problem. The Tweety story can be represented with the
same initial sentences at (1⁄), and letting the defaults consist of the non-abnormality predicates. In a hierarchy that allows
exceptions to exceptions and so on, consistency alone was insufﬁcient for making sensible inferences from a larger hierarchy
of defaults. In our Tweety story, penguins can (consistently) ﬂy because they are birds, or penguins can not ﬂy because they
are warmbloods.
Poole et al. [13] distinguished facts (categorical generalizations) as ‘‘background knowledge’’, from ‘‘contingent knowl-
edge’’, observations about individuals. He needed this distinction to develop an idea analogous to the subset principle that
he called ‘‘speciﬁcity’’. Where statistical inference used the narrowest reference class for which adequate statistics existed,
Poole preferred the conclusion reached using the set of defaults that necessarily used the narrowest contingent fact. More-
over, this idea generally achieved the right answer with the right rule, without the need for features like cancelation axioms.
Penguins don’t ﬂy because they are normal penguins, and not because they are normal warmbloods.
In hindsight, it is interesting to observe that the distinction between the background facts and the defaults became less
important in this version of Theorist. Both act like statistical statements in Kyburg’s formalism, except that they allow only
two levels of certainty. Meanwhile, contingent facts behaved like observations, and background knowledge behaved like
either logical or statistical truths.
The speciﬁcity result was widely cited, and Poole continued to study speciﬁcity until at least 1991 [17], where he contin-
ued to distinguish contingent and background knowledge, though none of his works on speciﬁcity reference Kyburg’s ideas
of randomness or acceptance.
6. Chaining and conjunction
Poole also discovered another signiﬁcant problem in nonmonotonic reasoning, closely related to Kyburg’s idea of accep-
tance. Discussing the Tweety story, he asked ‘‘When is it acceptable, given that birds typically ﬂy, and penguins typically do
not, to conclude that a bird Tweety is not a penguin?’’ Accepting such a conclusion is problematic in the various NMR for-
malisms, and notably arises after all the major jumping-to of conclusions has been solved, the multiple extensions have been
eliminated and we are making the right conclusions about ﬂying for the right reasons.
Why is it a bad conclusion to make? Suppose we have n subclasses partitioning the superclass bird:birdðXÞ ) penguinðXÞ _ hummingbirdðXÞ _ parrotðXÞ
and suppose further that each bird is unusual in some respect. Penguins cannot ﬂy, hummingbirds are tiny and parrots can
talk. As well, birds are normally unable to talk, able to ﬂy, and average-sized. Finally, suppose Tweety is a bird. Using the
‘‘birds ﬂy’’ default, we conclude Tweety ﬂies, and is not a penguin. We can also conclude that Tweety is not tiny and is there-
fore not a hummingbird. Now, we conclude that Tweety is a parrot. Now we can conclude that Tweety can talk, even though
birds typically cannot talk. By applying the defaults in a different order, we can conclude that Tweety does not talk and is not
tiny, and therefore is a penguin. Proof-theoretically, things have gotten pretty wild and woolly – we can conclude nearly any-
thing we want. Semantically, using the language of default logic, average-size, non-speaking, ﬂying birds no longer constitute
a unique minimal model for Tweety.
This is just a variation of the transitivity problem of defaults (especially it defaults can be contraposed), described much
earlier by Reiter and Crisculo [21]. These authors noticed that one can’t always naively chain on defaults, and so used semi-
normal defaults to limit transitive inference, proof-theoretically speaking. Semantically, semi-normal defaults can be used to
eliminate undesirable minimal models. Notably, Reiter and Crisculo used semi-normal defaults on an ad hoc basis to limit
unintuitive conclusions in short chains, and not to avoid general paradoxes. Poole suggested semi-normal defaults as one
way of avoiding the undesired conclusions.
Poole’s paper described this as being an instance of the famous lottery paradox of Kyburg, in particular, in the case of
where all bird species are known, and each one is exceptional in some way. Any bird may be inferred to be any species
and therefore hold the unusual properties of that bird.
Most generally, itwas an instance of ‘‘conjunctivitis’’ [7, Chapter 14], that seemingly ubiquitous view that the conjunction of
two beliefs (or practical certainties or defeasible conclusions) must also be a belief (or practical certainty or defeasibly held).
In my view, Poole’s result was a watershed moment for NMR. After a decade of optimistic research producing increasingly
complex formalism, the lottery paradox had not even been tamed. Its features had only been pushed into the background.
What kind of logic would remain without conjunction?
Transitive inference is just conjunction and simpliﬁcation of implications. But what does Kyburg’s formalism say about
contrapositives: jumping to the conclusion that birds are not penguins? To keep the analysis simple, assume that penguins
are categorically birds, and categorically do not ﬂy. Using b, p, f to represent bird,penguins and ﬂy, and letting pr(XjY) repre-
sent the conditional probability relation, note that
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for some threshold e, since it is a conclusion we wish to jump to. Kyburg’s formalism does not permit contraposing proba-
bilities, since this is a violation of the laws of probability. However, note thatprð:f jbÞ ¼ ðprð:f:pbÞ þ prð:fpbÞÞ=prðbÞ;
butprðpjbÞ ¼ ðprð:fpbÞ þ prðfpbÞÞ=prðbÞ ¼ prð:fpbÞ=prðbÞ:
Hence, pr(pjb) <= pr(:fjb), which implies pr(:pjb) >= pr(fjb), which means both sentences are practical certainties, that is, it is
a practical certainty that birds are not penguins. However, because practical certainties are maintained as a set of beliefs, and
can only be conjoined when the resulting conjunction is provably a practical certainty, we cannot generally use the practical
certainties that a bird is not a penguin and not a parrot to infer the bird is a hummingbird. (Pearl [11] gets a similar result
with his e-semantics. However, his formalism admits more beliefs than Kyburg’s, and concludes birds are typically not pen-
guins even when it is not certain that penguins do not ﬂy. To see that this is not true in Kyburg’s system, one can construct a
model by initially making all non-ﬂying birds penguins, that is pr(pb:f) = e  p(b), and then letting pr(pbf) = e2  p(b).)
There are three beneﬁts of this approach. First, we did not need contrapositives to conclude that a bird is typically not a
penguin. In fact, conditional probabilities simply do not contrapose: it is generally an error to contrapose them. Secondly, the
lottery paradox is avoided. Third, notice that without the constraint that no penguins ﬂy, all bets are off. If all the information
is qualitative, we can only conclude that a bird is typically not a penguin with some probability that might be expressed as a
function of the threshold value. Or, if we have numbers, we can express this as a probability. The colloquial expression
‘‘That’s a lot of ‘ifs’’’ can be interpreted as expressing hesitation over a conclusion derived from the conjunction of too many
practical certainties.
Notice however, that the probabilistic treatment of this problem here is far from difﬁcult. When the problems are simply
posed, the formalism permits intuitively agreeable ones, using straightforward calculations. I would even argue that the
semantics are richer, for all conclusions can be validated in the real world simply by doing some counting and choosing a
value for epsilon. However, it does begin with a mathematical framework very different than the logical approaches.
7. Conclusions
The NMR community was probably not the ﬁrst to think of the idea of uncertain reasoning without numbers. Koopman
[5] axiomatized probability qualitatively some time ago, arguing philosophically that certain subjective probabilities are
incomparable: the probability of this coin toss cannot be compared to the probability that the marriage of Jim and Shelley
will last more than 25 yr. However, as the kinds of events under discussion multiply, the number of qualitative probabilities
also proliferate, and we cannot communicate very well about outcomes. For example, an investor cannot choose between
two potentially successful options if they are sufﬁciently different, and eventually we turn to measurement.
This still does not mean that we are hamstrung without actual statistics. We can admit consistent estimates to a database,
and even parameterize them with symbolic constants representing an unspeciﬁed threshold of acceptance. In subsequent
computations, it is possible to derive certainties, practical certainties, and uncertainties that are simply unknown and require
us to do measurements or other further investigations (or, as Reiter suggests, rationalizations).
Interestingly, Israel [4], in an article reviewing some of the articles in the esteemed 1980 AIJ issue may have been the ﬁrst
to suggest that the logic-based approach would encounter problems and suggested investigators turn to philosophy of sci-
ence and epistemology. Moreover, he did so the same year that the special issue of the AI Journal on NMR appeared.
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